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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 20-2483
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSHUA GUITY-NUNEZ, a/k/a “V”
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 1:17-CR-0002-5)
Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo, U.S. District Judge
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on December 14, 2021
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 20, 2021)

__________
OPINION*
__________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Joshua Guity-Nunez appeals his sentence of 180-months’ imprisonment following
his guilty plea for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, threats of force, fraud,
or coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). We discern no error and will affirm.

I.

DISCUSSION1

The base offense level for a conspiracy crime is the same as the “guideline for [its]
substantive offense” when it has “not been directly assigned” a level under the
Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Sims, 957 F.3d 362, 363 (3d Cir. 2020); see
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1. As a result, two base offense levels are potentially applicable to a
conspiracy to commit sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a): When the
trafficking that is the object of the conspiracy involves minor victims or “force, threats of
force, fraud, or coercion,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1), the conspiracy, like the substantive
offense, carries a base offense level of 34; otherwise, consistent with the other types of

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, its factual findings for clear error,
and its application of the Guidelines to those facts for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2020). We review the substantive
reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. Id.
2

sex trafficking covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2), it carries an offense level of 14. See
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1; see also Sims, 957 F.3d at 363.

Here, because Guity-Nunez’s plea agreement and plea colloquy both described the
object of the conspiracy as “sex trafficking through use of force, fraud, and coercion,”
App. 175 (emphasis added), the Court applied a base offense level of 34. And because
the conspiracy involved minor victims, the Court added a two-point upward adjustment,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), App. 174, for “unduly influenc[ing] a minor to
engage in prohibited sexual conduct,” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). Guity-Nunez
challenges the resulting sentence on three grounds, none of which is persuasive.

First, Guity-Nunez contends that, because his indictment and plea agreement did
not specify whether his conspiracy offense was punishable under § 1591(b)(1) or
§ 1591(b)(2), the Court should have applied the lower base offense level of 14,
corresponding with § 1591(b)(2). But this argument is squarely foreclosed by our
decision in Sims, where we explained that, even if a defendant convicted under § 1594(c)
pleads guilty “only to conspiring to violate § 1591(a),” the base offense would still be 34
because “[s]ubsections 1591(a) and (b)(1) are inextricably linked.” Sims, 957 F.3d at 365
n.2. As a result, “convictions under § 1594(c) for conspiracy to violate § 1591(a) by
means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion”—like Guity-Nunez’s conviction
here— “always subject a defendant to a base offense level of 34.” Id. (emphasis added).

3

Next, Guity-Nunez disputes the District Court’s imposition of the two-level
upward adjustment under Section 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). The Court justified this enhancement
based on its finding that two of the victims attributable to Guity-Nunez were juveniles
and that it was reasonably foreseeable for some victims of a large sex trafficking
conspiracy to be underage. App. 164-65, 174. Those findings are amply supported by
the record, which includes evidence that Guity-Nunez was arrested immediately after
leaving a motel where police had arranged a sting operation with the two minor victims,
see App. 48, 113, and testimony from the trial of one of his co-conspirators reflecting that
the group worked together to traffic the minor victims, see App. 454, 655-660, 680.
Thus, while “the conduct a defendant is typically held responsible for under the
guidelines ‘is not coextensive with conspiracy law,’” United States v. Metro, 882 F.3d
431, 439 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Mannino, 212 F.3d 835, 842 (3d Cir.
2000)), the District Court’s findings here were not clearly erroneous, nor was its
application of the two-level enhancement an abuse of discretion.

Finally, Guity-Nunez argues that he received an unfair sentence in comparison to
his co-conspirators and suggests that he was unjustly penalized for refusing to cooperate
in the Government’s investigation. As he points out, apart from one co-conspirator who
went to trial and received a sentence of 300 months, Guity-Nunez’s 180-month sentence
was longer than the other conspirators, who received 140 months, 135 months, and 72
months. But that disparity is not unreasonable on its face, and there is no evidence that
the Government sought to penalize Guity-Nunez for declining to cooperate. To the
4

contrary, the prosecutor advocated for a substantial downward variance from the
Guidelines range, which the Court granted by imposing a sentence 40% below the
range’s lower bound. App. 178-81. Under these circumstances, Guity-Nunez cannot
show that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence . . . for
the reasons the district court provided.” Seibert, 971 F.3d at 399 (quoting United States
v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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